Scheppele introduces the concept of the to explain how these regimes sustain themselves.
Every move they make is backed by a parliamentary vote, a judicial ruling, or a constitutional amendment.
Autocrats borrow tactics—such as court-packing, constitutional amendments, and media control—from each other.
Laws are re-written to target NGOs, free media, and opposition figures, often under the guise of "national security," "anti-corruption," or "transparency" (as seen in Singapore's POFMA). autocratic legalism kim lane scheppele upd
Leaders win power through relatively fair elections, then claim a popular mandate to make sweeping changes that eventually eliminate the possibility of a peaceful rotation of power.
Kim Lane Scheppele, a professor of sociology and international affairs at Princeton University, has pioneered the study of this phenomenon, coining the term What is Autocratic Legalism?
Ensuring that courts, central banks, and election commissions remain outside the absolute control of the executive. Scheppele introduces the concept of the to explain
A free press is essential to democratic accountability, which is precisely why autocratic legalists move quickly to bring media under state control. Scheppele has documented how Orbán's government took direct control of public media, pressured private media owners to align with government narratives, and used advertising budgets to reward loyal outlets while starving critical ones. The result is an information ecosystem in which government corruption and abuse go unreported and opposition voices are systematically silenced.
[Democratic Mandate] ──> [Strategic Legal Innovation] ──> [Institutional Defanging] (Electoral Victory) (Borrowing Toxic Rules) (Eliminating Opposition)
: Scheppele coined this term to describe how autocrats take standard constitutional provisions from various liberal democracies and combine them to create an illiberal system that consolidates executive power. Facade of Legitimacy Laws are re-written to target NGOs, free media,
Once in power, the first target is typically the judiciary, particularly the constitutional court. As Scheppele has noted, "this is a critical step" for authoritarian leaders. By lowering mandatory retirement ages for judges, changing appointment procedures, packing courts with loyalists, and stripping courts of jurisdiction over politically sensitive matters, the executive removes the primary institutional check on its power. In Hungary, Orbán's government raised the retirement age for judges in a way that forced out dozens of experienced jurists, replacing them with party loyalists. In Poland, the PiS government introduced a disciplinary chamber for judges that answered directly to the political branches, effectively neutralizing judicial independence.
The core of Scheppele’s argument lies in the distinction between "rule by law" and "rule of law." In a liberal democracy, the rule of law acts as a constraint on power; the law stands above the ruler. In autocratic legalism, however, the law is instrumentalized—it becomes a weapon for the ruler to consolidate power and neutralize opponents.